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ABSTRACT       
Exchange-rate economics is filled with puzzles.  The asset approach has failed.  Purchasing 
Power Parity is useful at best in the long run.  There is no clear link between exchange rates and 
fundamentals.  With no empirically supported theory for exchange rates, open-economy macro 
models are built on sand.  This paper shows for the first time how recognizing differences 
between retail, wholesale and auction markets helps solve the puzzles, provides a theory of 
exchange rates based on auction markets for assets and commodities, and suggests a link 
between fundamentals and exchange rates.     
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1. Introduction. 
Classic articles by Officer (1976) and Rogoff (1996) describe a conventional view of 
Purchasing Power Parity (CPPP).1  Although Rogoff explicitly recognizes transaction costs, 
CPPP appears to implicitly assume a world like the one in the Pure Theory of Trade where there 
are no information or transaction costs and transportation from one international location to 
another is instantaneous.  For example, it assumes that, given exchange rates, arbitrage should 
equate spot retail commodity prices.2   
CPPP tries to be more “realistic” by recognizing “non-traded” goods.  But it fails to 
realize that the costs that make say haircuts non-traded, make all retail goods non-traded.  If there 
were no information or transaction costs and travel from one location to another were 
instantaneous, New Yorkers would just as soon go to a barber in London as go to a local barber.  
Haircuts, like everything else, would be traded.   
Information and transaction costs also divide markets into retail, wholesale and auction.3  
At retail, all goods are non-traded.  No one buys shoes in a department store in New York and 
sells them to a department store in London or Paris.  A Londoner in New York might buy a pair 
of shoes and take them home, but that is hardly “trade”.     
To be useful, theories must have semantic or correspondence rules that link at least some 
theoretical terms like “price” or “price index” to something we observe.  Theory normally guides 
such rules.  One would not measure a theoretical term like “domestic output” using a stock 
market measure like the DOW.   Semantic rules separate the conventional view of the Law of 
one Price (CLOP) and CPPP from the auction approach to the LOP (ALOP) and PPP (APPP) 
 
1 Officer ignores the role of the Law of One Price while Rogoff sees it as the foundation for all versions of PPP. 
2 The conventional approach then goes on to reject effective arbitrage and the LOP because it does not equate those prices.  See 
below. 
3 The role of information and transaction costs in dividing markets seems obvious, but, as far as we are aware, no one has 
explained how those costs divide markets. 
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developed below.4  Implicit semantic rules for the CLOP and CPPP link the theoretical concept 
“price” to observed prices for things like Kleenex in retail or wholesale markets.  Semantic rules 
for the ALOP and APPP link “price” to prices in auction markets. 
Goods are widely traded at the wholesale level, but there is almost no arbitrage.  It is only 
in auction markets where arbitrage is routine.  This distinction between markets also applies to 
financial markets where research routinely uses data from auction markets, not retail or 
wholesale markets.  The CLOP and CPPP mix auction and retail markets.5  
The discussion of arbitrage and the Law of One Price in Pippenger (2016) distinguishes 
between these markets.  It can be summed up as follows: After taking into account time in transit 
and differences in transaction costs, arbitrage is probably as effective in commodity auction 
markets as in financial auctions markets.  Articles like Engel and Rogers (1996), Asplund and 
Friberg (2001), and Parsley and Wei (2001) claim, or appear to claim, that arbitrage is ineffective 
and that the LOP fails.  But they use volatile exchange rates from auction markets and sticky 
commodity prices from retail markets where arbitrage is not possible.   
 
2. The LOP. 
The Law of One Price is relevant for both asset and commodity markets, but the details 
differ. 
2.1. Asset versus commodity. 
Whether markets are commodity or asset, arbitrage between retail markets is usually 
impossible and arbitrage between wholesale markets rare.  Arbitrage takes place primarily 
between auction markets. 
 
4 Unlike most exchange-rate economics, Sarno (205, 686) recognizes the importance of semantic rules for relative price levels. 
5 The CLOP and CPPP literature, at times, recognizes that mixing retail and auction prices might be a problem, but pays little 
attention to that problem. 
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Arbitrage between auction markets for identical financial assets is relatively simple, 
partly because the transfer of ownership is effectively instantaneous.  If, after converting to a 
common currency and accounting for transaction costs, prices differ between international 
locations, arbitragers buy low and sell high.  This rule applies to spot financial markets because it 
is the ownership of financial assets, not their location, that is relevant. 
Trade between auction commodity markets is more complex because location is 
important, transport takes time and transaction costs are higher for commodities.  But after taking 
into account the special conditions in auction markets for commodities, trade in those markets 
should resemble the trade in auction financial markets described in Akram, Farooq and Sarno 
(2008). 
Figure 1 describes trade in a world with retail, wholesale and auction markets. 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              FIGURE 1  
                                                               Arbitrage and Trade 
Retail markets in different countries are isolated.  There is no direct trade between them, 
but they are linked indirectly.  A firm producing shoes in Milan sells those shoes to retailers in 
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WHOLESALE WHOLESALE 
← No trade → 
RETAIL RETAIL 
uction Auction 
← Trade but very little arbitrage → 
←      Effective arbitrage            → 
HOME FOREIGN 
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London, Paris and New York.  Kansas farms produce wheat that is traded in auction markets and 
that is milled into the flour that bakeries in London, Paris and New York use to bake bread.  
Retail markets in London, Paris and New York are linked, but the links are indirect and work 
slowly.  As pointed out below, several of the common puzzles about exchange rates exist 
because they implicitly assume the kind of direct links that exist in the Pure Theory of Trade.  
Recognizing the differences between markets helps resolve those puzzles. 
2.2. Commodities. 
As pointed out above, arbitrage in spot commodities is usually impossible due to time in 
transit.6  As a result, the Law of One Price normally does not apply to spot commodities.  This 
subsection shows how the LOP can work for prices from auction markets.  It illustrates the 
economic logic behind the ALOP.  It does not “prove” that the ALOP holds.  Only rigorous 
testing can confirm the ALOP.    
The discussion starts with intertemporal arbitrage between near traded and more distantly 
traded goods in a given location.  For simplicity, it assumes that there is no implicit return to 
holding a commodity.  Firms like Bunge Ltd. and Carghill Inc. are as willing to hold a ton of a 
particular kind of wheat spot as to own a claim on that wheat in 90 days.    
W is a particular kind of wheat with a specific protein content and specified values for all 
the other characteristics normally included in contracts to buy or sell W.  The example uses spot 
and 90-day forward.  It starts with domestic equilibrium.          
 
2.2.1.  Domestic equilibrium.  For domestic equilibrium it must be impossible to make a 
risk-free profit by buying spot and selling forward or the opposite.  Equilibrium also excludes 
losses.  As the next Subsection shows, given reasonable assumptions, responding to losses or 
 
6 A few commodities like gold are exceptions.   
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risk-free profits can produce international equilibria involving forward prices and forward 
exchange rates.    
The United States is the home country.  ($/W)0 is the spot price of W in U.S. Gulf ports 
and ($/W)90 is the 90-day forward price of W in those ports.  0CC$90($/W)90 is the cost in future 
dollars of carrying W forward 90 days in Gulf ports. 0CC$90 is exogenous because W is only one 
of a wide variety of grains that is carried forward.  $i90 is the 90-day interest rate in the U.S.   It is 
exogenous because the borrowing and lending associated with trade in W is a miniscule part of 
the relevant capital market.  For simplicity, the discussion ignores the difference between bid and 
ask prices, and borrowing and lending rates.7 
Eq. (1) is one way to write the local equilibrium condition. 
[($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90]/(1+ $i90) = ($/W)0                                  (1)    
After deducting carrying costs, the present value of wheat carried forward equals the current 
value of that wheat.  Buying W spot and selling it forward, or the opposite, does not produce a 
profit or loss.     
If, starting in equilibrium, ($/W)0 falls, ($/W)90 rises, carrying costs fall or interest rates 
fall, there is a “risk-free” profit.8  [($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90]/(1+ $i90) is greater than ($/W)0.  
Arbitragers buy low and sell high.  They borrow W($/W)0 spot dollars, which they repay with 
W($/W)0(1+ $i90) future dollars, and buy W spot.  They sell W forward and carry it forward to 
meet their future commitment.  [($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90](1+ $i90) – ($/W)0 is the risk-free profit.  
As more W is purchased spot and carried forward, spot purchases raise ($/W)0 and forward sales 
lower ($/W)90 until arbitrage restores equilibrium. 
 
7 They would contribute to the thresholds discussed below. 
8 This profit is free of any risk associated with uncertain prices, but it is not completely free of risk.  There is always the risk that 
some contracting agent will default.  From this point on we will take this exception for granted and omit the “”.   
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If, starting in equilibrium, ($/W)0 rises, ($/W)90 falls, carrying costs rise or interest rates 
rise, carrying W forward produces losses.  [($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90]/(1+ $i90) is less than 
($/W)0.   Buying low and selling high is impossible because it is impossible to bring future wheat 
back to the present.  Two mechanisms work to restore equilibrium.    
The first involves arbitragers who sell high and buy low.  They “borrow” spot W and sell it 
short, invest the proceeds and buy forward.9  This arbitrage reduces the inequality written as 
[($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90] < ($/W)0(1+ $i90) by raising ($/W)90 and lowering ($/W)0,  but it does 
not restore equilibrium unless the cost of selling short is zero.   Let $ε90W represent the cost of 
borrowing W for 90 days over and above the interest rate.  If $ε90 is zero, as long as                        
[($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90] < ($/W)0(1+ $i90), arbitragers make a risk-free profit by selling short 
and buying forward.  If $ε90 is positive, selling short produces a risk-free profit only as long as 
[($/W)90 – 0CC$90($/W)90] < ($/W)0(1+ $i90 – $ε90).  Arbitrage lowers ($/W)0 and raises ($/W)90, 
but it does not fully restore equilibrium      
A second mechanism is also at work.  Firms stop carrying W forward because it produces a 
loss.10  Not carrying W forward raises ($/W)90 and lowers ($/W)0 until, under normal 
circumstances, equilibrium is restored. 
Together these two mechanisms work to restore equilibrium.11  How well auction markets 
respond to such shocks is an empirical issue that needs to be addressed.  What follows considers 
what happens when local equilibria hold. 
Eq. (1) can be written in a more useful form as follows:                                                                                             
 
9 See Wikipedia for the details of selling short. 
10 Firms that were carrying W forward and covered that commitment do not take a loss.  If they did not cover, they do. 
11 It is possible that this process does not restore equilibrium.  
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($/W)90[1 – 0CC$90] = ($/W)0(1+ $i90)                        (1’)  
After accounting for the carrying costs, the future value of present wheat equals the future value 
of future wheat.   
Similar transactions produce a similar equilibrium in Rotterdam.  The notation for 
Rotterdam is as follows:  (€/W)0 is the spot euro price of W in Rotterdam and (€/W)90 is the 
forward euro price of W in Rotterdam in 90 days.  0CC€90(€/W)90 is the cost in future euros of 
carrying W forward by 90 days in Rotterdam.  0CC€90 is exogenous for the same reason 0CC$90 
is exogenous.  €i90 is the 90-day euro interest rate.   It is exogenous for the same reason $i90 is 
exogenous.  Eq. (2) describes the relevant equilibrium condition in Rotterdam. 
(€/W)90[1 – 0CC€90] = (€/W)0(1+ €i90)                         (2)   
Full international equilibrium assumes local equilibrium. 
 
2.2.2.  International equilibrium.  Comparative advantage drives trade.  See Wikipedia for 
a discussion of comparative advantage.  Here we consider just W where exchange rates are 
exogenous.  In that context trade depends on where, in the absence of trade, W is cheapest in a 
common currency.      
Where ever W is cheapest, direct trade between spot commodity markets in different 
locations is impossible, as is direct arbitrage between forward markets of the same maturity in 
different locations.  But arbitrage is possible between t = x and t = y, as long as they are both 
positive and y is sufficiently greater than x to allow for time in transit.12  In this example, x is 
zero and y is 90 days. 
($/€)0 is the spot dollar price of the euro and ($/€)90 is the 90-day forward price of the euro.  
(€/$)0 is the spot euro price of the dollar and (€/$)90 is the 90-day forward price of the dollar. For 
 
12 Time in transit depends on transportation costs.  Fast ships are more expensive per ton than slow ships.  Airplanes are faster 
and more expensive than fast ships.  The greater the profit, the smaller the difference between x and y. 
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simplicity, the discussion ignores bid-ask spreads, ($/€)0 = 1/(€/$)0  and ($/€)90  = 1/(€/$)90.  
Exchange rates are exogenous because the foreign exchange involved in trading W is only a 
minuscule part of the foreign exchange market.  The 90-day interest rate in the euro area, €i90, is 
exogenous for the same reason $i90 is exogenous.     
0TC$90(€/W)90($/€)90 is the cost in future dollars of shipping W from a Gulf port to 
Rotterdam while 0TC€90($/W)90(€/$)90 is the cost in future euros of shipping W from Rotterdam 
to a Gulf port.  0TC$90 and 0TC€90 are exogenous because W is only one of many grains traded 
between Gulf ports and Rotterdam.   
Ignoring transport costs, carrying costs and interest rates for simplicity, W flows from Gulf 
ports to Rotterdam when, in the absence of trade, W is cheaper in Gulf ports, e.g., when ($/W)90 
is less than ($/€)90(€/W)90.13  W flows from Rotterdam to Gulf ports when (€/W)90 is less than 
(€/$)90($/W)90, i.e., when ($/W)90 is greater than ($/€)0(€/W)90.  The effects of transport costs, 
carrying costs and interest rates are discussed below.   
When Gulf ports have the price advantage, if W moves, it moves from Gulf ports to 
Rotterdam.  In that case, one way to express equilibrium is that ($/€)90(€/W)90[1 – 0TC$90]           
= ($/W)0(1+ $i90).  The future dollar value of spot W in a Gulf port equals the future dollar value 
of shipping W to Rotterdam, selling it forward there and selling those future euros forward at 
($/€)90.  Note that trade can continue from day to day in this equilibrium without any risk-free 
profits or avoidable losses.  They become relevant when equilibria are violated.   
If, starting in equilibrium yesterday, today ($/€)90 rises, (€/W)90 rises, ($/W)0 falls, $i90 falls 
or 0TC$90 falls, today there is an arbitrage profit because ($/€)90(€/W)90[1 – 0TC$90] >     
 
13 Trade equates observed prices.  In the absence of all impediments to trade, observed ($/W)90 would equal observed 
($/€)0(€/W)90 which-ever way W is moving.  Observed price differentials are the result of impediments.  Larger 
observed differentials do not necessarily increase the volume of trade, they can reduce trade.  Other things equal, 
larger impediments increase observed differentials and reduce trade. 
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($/W)0(1+ $i90).  Arbitragers borrow W($/W)0 spot dollars which they repay with                             
W($/W)0(1+ $i90) future dollars, buy W spot in a Gulf port, ship it to Rotterdam where they sell it 
forward for W(€/W)90 and sell those forward euros for  forward dollars.  They do all this as 
closely to simultaneously as possible.  Purchases raise ($/W)0 and sales reduce (€/W)90, restoring 
equilibrium. 
If, starting in equilibrium yesterday, today ($/€)90 falls, (€/W)90 falls, ($/W)0 rises, $i90 rises, 
or 0TC$90 rises, then ($/€)90(€/W)90[1 – 0TC$90] < ($/W)0(1+ $i90).  If these changes are large 
enough, Gulf ports lose their advantage and W moves from Rotterdam to Gulf ports, lowering 
($/W)0 by lowering ($/W)90 and raising (€/W)90.   
If the shock does not shift the advantage to Rotterdam, but reduces the Gulf port advantage 
so that it no longer covers the net transaction costs, trade stops.  (€/W)90 rises as selling stops and 
($/W)0 falls as exports stop, but this absence of trade does not necessarily restore equilibrium. 
The subsection on Thresholds below discusses what happens in those two cases.  If Gulf 
ports continue to ship to Rotterdam, firms earn more future dollars by selling W spot and 
investing the proceeds than by shipping W to Rotterdam.  Reduced exports lower ($/W)0 and 
raise (€/W)90, which works to restore equilibrium.   
Assuming that adjustment restores ($/W)90(€/W)90[1–0TC$90] = ($/W)0(1+ $i90), full 
international equilibrium requires local equilibrium.  Using the equilibrium condition in Gulf 
ports that ($/W)90[1 – 0CC$90] = ($/W)0(1+ $i90), international equilibrium with trade from Gulf 
ports to Rotterdam can be written as follows: ($/€)90(€/W)90[1 – 0TC$90] = ($/W)90[1 – 0CC$90].  
Solving that equation for [($/W)90/(€/W)90] yields eq. (3). 
 11 
 
 [($/W)90/(€/W)90] = [($/€)90(1 – 0TC$90)]/[1 – 0CC$90]                                                               (3) 
Exogenous exchange rates, transport costs and carrying costs determine relative prices in 
equilibrium.         
Using the approximation that log(1+a) equals a when a is small, eq. (3) can be written in 
logarithmic form as eq. (3’).  
log[($/W)90/(€/W)90] = log($/€)90 + [0TC$90 – 0CC$90]                                                              (3’)   
Transactions similar to those discussed above produce a similar equilibrium condition for 
buying in Rotterdam and selling in Gulf ports.  It is (€/$)90($/W)90[1 – 0TC€90] = (€/W)0(1+ €i90).   
Using the local equilibrium that (€/W)90[1 – 0CC€90] = (€/W)0(1+ €i90), this equilibrium can 
be written as follows: (€/$)90($/W)90[1 – 0TC€90] = (€/W)90[1 – 0CC€90], which implies eq. (4).  
($/W)90/(€/W)90= [1–0CC€90]/{(€/$)90[1–0TC€90]} = {($/€)90[1–0CC€90]}/[1–0TC€90]               (4)  
Exogenous exchange rates, transport costs and carrying costs determine ($/W)90/(€/W)90 in 
equilibrium. 
Using logarithms, eq. (4) can be written as eq. (4’).14 
log[($/W)90/(€/W)90] = log($/€)90 + 0TC€90 – 0CC€90            (4’) 
Eqs. (3’) and (4’) differ.  That difference reflects thresholds.   
  
2.2.3.  Thresholds.  To see how transaction costs create thresholds, consider first a world 
without transport or carrying costs, but with a given exchange rate.  Let (€/$)90 be that rate.  
(€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 converts ($/W)90/(€/W)90 to a common currency, the euro.  For “low” 
($/W)90/(€/W)90 in the absence of trade, Gulf ports export to Rotterdam because in euros W is 
cheaper in Gulf ports.  
 
14 Note that log($/€)90 in eq. (4’) equals –log(€/$)90 where (€/$)90 is from eq. (4).            
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As (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 in the absence of trade rises because ($/W)90/(€/W)90 rises, that 
advantage declines until we reach a point where (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 equals one and the euro 
price of W in the absence of trade is the same in Gulf ports and Rotterdam.  Trade stops.  Call 
that (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 tipping point T where T equals one.  As ($/W)90/(€/W)90 in the 
absence of trade rises, (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 rises beyond T, and (€/W)90/($/W)90 in the absence 
of trade falls, the advantage switches to Rotterdam because the euro price of W in the absence of 
trade is now lower in Rotterdam than in Gulf ports.      
Now consider the effect of transport costs.  For a range of (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 below T, 
transport costs prevent Gulf ports from exporting to Rotterdam.  Call the minimum                                       
(€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 tipping point L.  L = 1 - 0TC$90.  For Rotterdam to export to Gulf ports, 
Rotterdam’s advantage must cover its transport costs.  Call that higher (€/$)90($/W)90/(€/W)90 
tipping point U.  U = 1 + 0TC€90. 
Ignoring carrying costs, U is the upper threshold and L is the lower threshold.  Between 
those thresholds the equilibrium conditions developed above do not hold.  As a result, 
($/W)90/(€/W)90 can move more or less freely between U and L.  Including carrying costs 
changes U and L, but it does not change the logic behind thresholds.15  
   
2.2.4.  Summary.  Under some hopefully reasonable assumptions, after accounting for 
thresholds, the ALOP holds for individual commodities in auction markets.  That top down 
reasoning does not tell us whether or not the ALOP actually holds.  That question must be 
answered empirically.  Firms like Bunge Ltd. and Carghill Inc. together with the auction markets 
in Rotterdam and Gulf ports should have the information necessary for such tests.  But that 
 
15 When there are carrying costs, in the logarithmic version, L = – [0TC$90 – 0CC$90] and U = [0TC€90 –0CC€90].  Under normal 
circumstances, both [0TC$90 – 0CC$90] and [0TC€90 –0CC€90] should be positive. 
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information is not easily available.  Collecting it and performing the appropriate tests will be 
expensive and time consuming.  Is the game worth the candle? 
To help determine whether or not the game is worth the candle, the rest of this paper 
assumes that the ALOP holds for commodities in auction markets and examines some of its 
implications beginning with its implications for APPP.  It would be strange if, after accounting 
for time in transit, transaction costs and thresholds, the LOP held in auction markets for financial 
assets but not in auction markets for commodities. 
 
3. APPP.  
The logic of the shift from LOP to PPP is the same for APPP as for CPPP.  For CLOP, 
ignoring transaction costs, a ratio of prices like ($/W)0/(€/W)0 denoted qi(t) equals the domestic 
price of foreign exchange S(t).  That equality also holds for any bundle of qi(t) denoted Q(t) so 
that S(t) = Q(t).  The shift to PPP involves a reinterpretation of this relationship when i is large.  
For S(t) = qi(t), qi(t) adjusts to S(t).  For PPP with large i the usual interpretation is that S(t) 
adjusts to Q(t) where Q(t) is the ratio of a domestic price level PD(t) relative to a foreign price 
level PF(t), i.e., PD(t)/PF(t) or just P(t).16 
For CPPP, P(t) is made up of current consumer or wholesale price indexes, which can 
have different weights, and S(t) is the current spot price of foreign exchange in an auction 
market.  That is S(t) = P(t) where it is understood that S(t) moves more or less freely within 
thresholds around P(t).   
For APPP, “P(t)” is a ratio of price indexes using auction prices for y days forward where 
weights are identical denoted PA(t+y) and “S(t)” is the current domestic price of foreign 
 
16 As part of this shift, costs that were exogenous like transport and carrying costs become endogenous. 
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exchange y days forward denoted F(t+y).  F(t+y) = PA(t+y) where now F(t+y) moves more or 
less freely within thresholds around PA(t+y).17          
Using auction markets, the next section develops an asset and commodity theory of 
exchange rates, i.e., ACTFX.  For ACTFX it is convenient to express APPP logarithmically as       
f(t + x) = pA(t + x) where f(t + x) is the log of F(t + x) and pA(t + x) is the log of PA(t + x).     
 
4. ACTFX 
No one claims that the asset approach to exchange rates is a success.  We know no more 
about the short-run behavior of exchange rates now than we did before the switch to an asset 
approach in the 1970s.  The widely recognized puzzle that there is no link between economic 
fundamentals and exchange rates is an implicit recognition of that fact.  But casual observation 
suggests that asset markets affect exchange rates.  We see exchange rates apparently responding 
to interest rates.   
The objective of this section is to develop a theory of exchange rate determination based 
on auction markets for both assets and commodities.  It begins with Covered Interest Parity. 
 
4.1. CIP 
There is substantial empirical support for Covered Interest Parity (CIP).  See for example 
Akram, Farooq and Sarno (2008).  CIP says that F(t+y)/S(t) = (1+usiy)/(1+€iy).  This equality is 
usually expressed in a logarithmic approximation as f(t+y) – s(t) = usiy – €iy.   
CIP is an example of the ALOP in financial markets.  Suppose f(t+y) equals s(t), but €iy is 
less than usiy.  There is a risk-free profit.  A large money market bank can borrow a million euro 
at €iy, use that million euro to buy a million dollars, invest that million dollars at the higher usiy 
and sell those dollars forward for euros, earning an almost instantaneous risk-free profit of 
 
17 As in the example above, x =0. 
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€1,000,000.00(1 + usix) minus €1,000,000.00(1 + €ix).  As Akram, Farooq and Sarno (2008) point 
out, opportunities for such profits do not last much longer than a few minutes.         
The usual interpretation of CIP is that usiy – €iy + s(t) determine f(t+y).  That interpretation 
is reasonable because the volume of transactions in spot foreign exchange markets is greater than 
in any individual forward market.  But that interpretation is less convincing when we compare 
the combined volume of transactions in all forward markets to the volume in the spot market.   
Eq. (5) is an aggregate version of CIP where each maturity is weighted by the relative 
volume of transactions, wx.  As far as we are aware, no one has ever expressed CIP in this way 
before.  
s(t) = 
y=1
N
 wx[f(t+y) + €iy – usiy ]                                                                                                      (5) 
Eq. (5) is an aggregate restatement of CIP where €iy – usiy captures the role of capital markets in 
determining spot exchange rates.  APPP captures the role of commodity markets. 
             
4.2. APPP. 
The next step to ACTFX adds the role of auction commodity markets where, ignoring 
thresholds, f(t+y) = pA(t+y).  Using APPP, replace f(t+y) in eq. (5) with pA(t+y).   That 
replacement converts eq. (5) into eq. (6), ACTFX.     
s(t) = 
y=1
N
 wx[pA(t+y) + €iy – usiy]                                                                                                    (6)  
Eq. (6) describes how the interaction between auction markets for financial assets and 
auction markets for commodities affects spot exchange rates.  One advantages of eq. (6) is that 
the data needed for testing it should be available on a daily basis. 
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Eq. (6) is directly relevant only for those countries with appropriate auction markets.  That 
requirement restricts it to developed countries and not to all developed countries.  But the 
economics behind eq. (6) applies to all countries.  At the retail level all goods are non-traded.  
Arbitrage is rare at the wholesale level and the only routine arbitrage is in auction markets. 
 
5.  Puzzles.   
In Rogoff (1996) the PPP puzzle is the very high short-run volatility of real exchange rates 
combined with the very slow rate at which the half-lives for deviations from PPP die out.  His 
explanation is that, in spite of progress, international commodity markets remain highly 
segmented.  When Rogoff refers to international markets being highly segmented, he is referring 
to retail commodity markets.18   
We believe that the distinction between retail, wholesale and auction markets provides a 
better explanation.  International auction markets are highly integrated.  International retail 
markets are highly segmented and always will be.   
In the years since 1996 PPP puzzles have increased and been refined.  Rogoff’s puzzle has 
become three related puzzles: “excessive” exchange rate volatility, short-run PP versus long run 
PPP and long half lives for deviations from PPP.  Two additional puzzles are that PPP works 
during inflation, but not in normal times, and the lack of any fundamentals that explain the 
behavior of exchange rates. 
   We take up these puzzles in the following order: (1) PPP works when there is inflation, 
but not in normal times.  (2) PPP may work in the long run, but not in the short run.  (3) Long 
half-lives for real PPP differentials.  (4) Exchange rate volatility is excessive. and (5) A lack of 
fundamentals.  
 
18  At one point, p. 650, Rogoff indirectly refers to auction markets.  The prices for gold in his Table 2 appear to be 
from auction markets.  But he appears to quickly dismiss the role of such prices for PPP.  
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5.1. Inflation versus normal.   
Frenkel (1981) is a seminal source of the idea that PPP works during inflation but fails in 
normal times.   Using wholesale and cost of living price indexes, he compares the performance 
of relative PPP during the inflationary 1920s to its performance during the 1970s.  Based on 
relative 
-
R2s, Frenkel concludes that PPP worked during the inflationary 1920s, but not during the 
more normal 1970s. 
Davutyan and Pippenger (1985) point out that this conclusion is a statistical illusion, a 
result of misinterpreting 
-
R2 in the context of thresholds.  A simple example makes the point 
about using 
-
R2 to compare relative performance.   Suppose CPPP is essentially constant and 
exchange rates never exceed the thresholds.  CPPP always holds.  Now consider the case where 
CPPP and exchange rates both rise due to inflation and exchange rates often exceed the 
thresholds.  CPPP often fails.  CPPP clearly works better in the first than the second case.  But if 
you test relative CPPP during “normal” times the 
-
R2 is zero while it is positive with inflation. 
Most of the problem is the result of comparing retail prices to auction prices.  In normal 
times CPPP volatility is small due to sticky retail prices while exchange rates are volatile 
because they are auction prices.  As inflation increases, retail prices become more flexible.  In 
hyperinflation retail prices change by the hour or even by the minute.   
The difference between inflationary and normal times should largely disappear with 
APPP.  Using commodity prices from auction markets, thresholds are much narrower and the 
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volatility of relative price levels much lager.  The problem with 
-
R2 largely disappears and with it 
the apparent distinction between inflationary and normal times.19 
 
5.2. Long run versus short run.   
The evidence clearly rejects CPPP as a theory for the short-run behavior of exchange 
rates.  But there is support for it as a long-run theory.  See for example Sarno and Taylor (2002). 
APPP also solves this puzzle.  As above, the source of the puzzle is comparing sticky 
retail prices to volatile auction exchange rates.   
CPPP fails in the short run because there is no direct link between international retail 
markets.  At the retail level, all goods are non-traded.  As a result, short-run thresholds for CPPP 
are very wide.  Sticky retail prices reduce the short-run volatility of CPPP.  In the short run, wide 
thresholds and sticky prices disconnect exchange rates from CPPP.  The disconnect for 
wholesale prices is smaller, but still large.   
In the long run, CPPP approaches APPP.  Long run links between retail markets are 
stronger because the indirect links through wholesale and auction markets strengthen in the long 
run.  These stronger links reduce long-run thresholds.  Retail prices also are more flexible in the 
long run.  Narrower threshold and more flexible retail prices reduce the disconnect.  CPPP works 
better in the long run than short run. 
APPP should substantially reduce the difference between long run and short run.  With 
APPP short-run thresholds are narrower and prices more flexible.  The difference between long 
run and short run should be much smaller with APPP and potentially disappear.          
 
 
 
 
19 Note that with APPP one regresses changes in forward rates against changes in a ratio of forward commodity prices. 
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5.3. Long half-lives for real CPPP differentials.   
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) list long half-lives for real CPPP differentials as one of the 
six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.  Again, the source of the problem is 
comparing sticky retail prices to volatile auction exchange rates.     
Half-life differentials using CPPP are long because the tests use prices in retail markets 
where all goods are non-traded.  It should not be a surprise that real price differentials between 
non-traded goods have half-lives measured in years.   
APPP indexes do not yet exist.  But comparing CLOP and ALOP provides some insight 
into what we can expect.  As pointed out above, the evidence rejects CLOP.  But the evidence 
supports ALOP.  As Pippenger (2016) reports, real half-life differentials between spot 
commodity auction prices are measured in just a few weeks.  For monthly intervals, spot half 
lives would essentially disappear despite the fact that ALOP does not hold for spot auction 
markets.        
 
5.4. Excessive volatility.   
As is well known, the volatility of exchange rates is much larger than the volatility of 
corresponding CPPP.  This difference in volatility is the primary evidence behind the belief that 
exchange-rate volatility is “excessive”.  Again, the source of the problem is comparing sticky 
retail prices to volatile auction prices. 
Exchanges rate between the U.S. and Canada have been floating for over 25 years.  As an 
example of “excessive” volatility with CPPP, using monthly data from 1975 through 2020, the 
variance of the change in the log of the Canadian price of U.S. dollars is 0.000226 while the 
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variance in the change in the log of the corresponding CPPP is only 0.000018, a ratio of over 12 
to 1.20  Exchange rate volatility is 12 times greater than CPPP volatility. 
The explanation for this puzzle is similar to the one for the three previous puzzles.  
Exchange rates are from auction markets while commodity prices are from retail markets.  No 
one would be surprised to find that the volatility of the price of a common variety of wheat on 
the Chicago Board of Trade, whose price changes from minute to minute, is 12 times greater 
than the volatility of the price of bread in Chicago grocery stores, whose price often does not 
change for days.  Why are we surprised by a ratio of 12 to 1 when we compare auction exchange 
rates to retail price levels?     
We do not yet have data for APPP, but we do have data for individual auction commodity 
markets, which can give us some insight into APPP.  At least it compares auction to auction.  
Using weekly data from spot auction markets, Bui and Pippenger (1990) find that the volatility 
of spot exchange rates implied by spot relative prices, e.g. [($/W)0\(€/W)0], is greater than the 
volatility of actual spot exchange rates.  Instead of a ratio of 12 to 1, the ratio is less than 1. 
Of course, their results apply to spot auction markets, not forward auction markets.  In 
addition, they use individual auction prices, not indexes.  But their results suggest that using 
APPP rather than CPPP would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the primary evidence for 
excessive volatility. 
 
5.5. Exchange-rate disconnect. 
The exchange-rate disconnect refers to the lack of any clear link between exchange rates 
and economic fundamentals.  It is another one of the six major puzzles in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000).  ACTFX has the potential to solve this puzzle. 
 
20 All data are from FRED. 
 
 21 
 
Casual observation suggests that relative price levels and financial markets are two 
important fundamentals.  CPPP fails for the reasons discussed above.  Why the asset approach to 
exchange rates fails is not yet obvious, possibly it is because an asset approach ignores APPP. 
Using auction markets for assets and commodities, ACTFX combines relative price 
levels and financial markets.  It has the potential to resolve the exchange-rate disconnect by 
linking exchange rates to financial and commodity markets.  Only careful research can determine 
whether or not that potential is realized.  Even if it is realized, ACTFX will only be a bridge to a 
deeper understanding of the links between fundamentals and exchange rates. 
 
5.6. Summary. 
The important role of transaction costs in exchange-rate economics is widely recognized.  
Transaction costs play a key role here, but not because they cause imperfect competition, sticky 
wages and sticky prices, which they do.21  This paper stresses the role of information and 
transaction costs in dividing markets into retail, wholesale and auction.  The position taken here 
is that to understand the effects of things like imperfect competition, sticky prices and sticky 
wages we must first recognize the more important effects of the distinction between retail, 
wholesale and auction markets.  The ability of APPP and/or ACTFX to explain so many puzzles 
suggests that the game is worth the candle. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions. 
Information and transaction costs play an important role in open-economy 
macroeconomics.  They are the source of market imperfections, sticky prices and non-traded 
goods.  But exchange-rate economics has ignored another effect of such costs: the division of 
 
21 Without restrictions, appealing to transaction costs can explain everything, which means they explain nothing.  Our position is 
simple.  We assume that transaction costs behave like other costs.  More precisely, they behave like the postulates on costs in 
Alchian (1959).  
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markets into retail, wholesale and auction.  Ignoring that division, exchange-rate economics has 
routinely compared the behavior of sticky retail prices to the behavior of flexible auction 
exchange rates, which compares apples to oranges.  Recognizing that division, we suggest a new 
way of thinking about the LOP and PPP based on auction prices that we call ALOP and APPP.  
ALOP and APPP solve several of the puzzles associated with exchange-rate economics.  The 
distinction between retail, wholesale and auction markets also suggests a theory of exchange 
rates that we develop here for the first time using auction markets for commodities and assets.  
We call it ACTFX.  ACTFX provides a potential link between exchange rates and fundamentals, 
and a potential solid foundation for open-economy macro models. 
Testing the relative merits of APPP versus conventional PPP and comparing the relative 
merits of the asset approach to spot exchange rates versus ACTFX creates many opportunities 
for future research. 
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